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Gender Differences in Giving and the Anticipation Regarding Giving in Dictator Games
Research on altruistic behaviour and associated anticipatory beliefs, as well as related gender differences, is limited. Using data from Chowdhury and Jeon, who vary a common show-up fee and incentivize recipients to...
Gender Differences in Giving and the Anticipation Regarding Giving in Dictator Games
Research on altruistic behaviour and associated anticipatory beliefs, as well as related gender differences, is limited. Using data from Chowdhury and Jeon, who vary a common show-up fee and incentivize recipients to...
The Attack and Defense Mechanisms – Perspectives from Behavioral Economics and Game Theory
Subhasish M. Chowdhury
Jan 01, 0001
This commentary complements the article by De Dreu and Gross (2019) from the perspectives of behavioral economics and game theory. It aims to provide a bridge between the psychology / neuroscience research with that of economic...
A Generalized Tullock Contest
We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning or losing, the payoff of a player is a linear function of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival. This structure nests...
The Hidden Perils of Affirmative Action
Contests are ubiquitous in economic, organizational and political settings. Contest designers often use tools to make a contest among asymmetric contestants more even, in order to either elicit higher effort levels, or for...
The All-Pay Auction with Nonmonotonic Payoff
Subhasish M. Chowdhury
Oct 01, 2017
I model innovation contests as an all-pay auction in which it is possible not to achieve successful innovation despite costly R&D investments, and as a result, there is no winner. In such a case, the winning payoff turns out...
The Attack and Defense Mechanisms – Perspectives from Behavioral Economics and Game Theory
Subhasish M. Chowdhury
Jan 01, 0001
This commentary complements the article by De Dreu and Gross (2019) from the perspectives of behavioral economics and game theory. It aims to provide a bridge between the psychology / neuroscience research with that of economic...
Conflict in the Time of (Post-) Corona
Subhasish M. Chowdhury
Sep 30, 2020
We present a non-technical assessment of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on individual level conflict behavior in the household, workplace, and societal interactions in the post-COVID era. We predict that there will be an...
Introduction to the Symposium - Contests
This Symposium consists of five studies in the area of “Contests.” These peer-reviewed papers were among a larger set of research presented at the 2016 conference “Contests: Theory and Evidence” at the University of East...
The All-Pay Auction with Nonmonotonic Payoff
Subhasish M. Chowdhury
Oct 01, 2017
I model innovation contests as an all-pay auction in which it is possible not to achieve successful innovation despite costly R&D investments, and as a result, there is no winner. In such a case, the winning payoff turns out...
A Generalized Tullock Contest
We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning or losing, the payoff of a player is a linear function of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival. This structure nests...
Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests
We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests, and show that asymmetric equilibria arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We then present existing contests...
Conflict in the Time of (Post-) Corona
Subhasish M. Chowdhury
Sep 30, 2020
We present a non-technical assessment of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on individual level conflict behavior in the household, workplace, and societal interactions in the post-COVID era. We predict that there will be an...
Auction versus posted price mechanisms in online sales
If all potential buyers participate in a first-price auction, then (theoretically) the auction price weakly exceeds the price placed by the seller under a posted-price mechanism. However, it is documented that in the online...
Exclusivity and exclusion on platform Markets
We examine conditions under which an exclusive license granted by the upstream producer of a component that some consumers regard as essential to one of two potential suppliers of a downstream platform market can make the...
Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments
We revisit the meta-analysis of Sheremeta on overbidding in contest experiments and focus on the effect of endowment on overbidding. Sheremeta assumes, and finds evidence of, an increasing linear relationship between endowment...
Introduction to the Symposium - Contests
This Symposium consists of five studies in the area of “Contests.” These peer-reviewed papers were among a larger set of research presented at the 2016 conference “Contests: Theory and Evidence” at the University of East...
Applications of Sports Data to Study Decision Making
The features and determinants of human decision making, especially under competitive environments, have been a central theme of research in economics and psychology alike. This special issue centers on applying sports data to...
Auction versus posted price mechanisms in online sales
If all potential buyers participate in a first-price auction, then (theoretically) the auction price weakly exceeds the price placed by the seller under a posted-price mechanism. However, it is documented that in the online...
The Max-Min Group Contest
We investigate a group all-pay auction in which each group's effort is represented by the minimum among the effort levels exerted by the group members and the prize is a group-specific public good. We fully characterize the...
Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry
We investigate simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflict in the shadow of within-group power asymmetry and complementarity in members' group-conflict efforts. A more symmetric group faces a higher degree of internal conflict...
Group Size and Matching Protocol in Contests
We investigate the effects of group size and matching protocol in Tullock contest experiments. In a 2x2 factorial design we implement partner and random stranger matching protocols in contests between two and between three...
Post-Cartel Tacit Collusion
We experimentally investigate the determinants of post-cartel tacit collusion (PCTC), the effects of PCTC on market outcomes, and potential policy measures aimed at its prevention. PCTC occurs robustly with or without fines or...
“Small, yet Beautiful”
We reconsider whether a grand multi-winner contest elicits more equilibrium effort than a collection of sub-contests. Fu and Lu (2009) employ a sequential winner-selection mechanism and find support for running a grand contest....
Applications of Sports Data to Study Decision Making
The features and determinants of human decision making, especially under competitive environments, have been a central theme of research in economics and psychology alike. This special issue centers on applying sports data to...
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